

Message Text

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64/46

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NRC-05 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 EUR-12 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05

OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 SAJ-01 EB-07

COME-00 JUSE-00 FTC-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 /131 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1672

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y-MRN 6286 VICE 6281

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CCD, CA, PK, NI, IR

SUBJ: CCD - 717TH PLENARY MEETING, AUG 3, 1976

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REF: GENEVA 6121

1. SUMMARY: NETHERLANDS, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND IRAN SPOKE IN AUG 3 CCD PLENARY. NETHERLANDS DISCUSSED PNE TREATY, PRAISING ITS ON-SIET OBSERVATION PROVISIONS BUT SAYING AGREEMENT HAD NOT SOLVED PROBLEM OF PNES UNDER A CTB; THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY, REPEATING THAT THRESHOLD WAS TOO HIGH; AND COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, SAYING GREAT POWERS' POSITIONS ON ISSUE SYMBOLIZED THEIR ATTITUDES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. NIGERIA PRAISED RESULTS OF CCD MEETINGS DEVOTED TO MID-TERM REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT DECADE, THEN CRITICIZED US SUGGESTION THAT COMMITTEE DEVOTE ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. PAKISTAN CALLED FOR COMPREHENSIVE ENMOD CONVENTION AND BAN ON THREAT OF HOSTILE USE. IN TOUR D'HORIZON ON CCD ISSUES, CZECHOSLOVAKIA ALSO ADVOCATED SUCH A BAN. IRAN APPRAISED CW STATUS, SAW NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES OVER SCOPE OF BAN, AND SUGGESTED SOME WAYS TOWARD FURTHER PROGRESS ON CW. END SUMMARY.

2. NETHERLANDS REP (VAN DER KLAUW), BEGAN WITH A DISCUSSION OF PNE TREATY. IN CONCLUDING THE TREATY, HE SAID, US AND USSR HAD FOLLOWED THE BASIC APPROACH OF REQUIRING INDIVIDUAL PNES TO REMAIN UNDER THE SAME YIELD THRESHOLD OF 150 KILOTONS THAT THE TTBT REQUIRES FOR WEAPONS TESTS; THEREFORE, LOWERING THE TEST BAN THRESHOLD WOULD ALSO REQUIRE LOWERING THE THRESHOLD FOR INDIVIDUAL PNES. SINCE THE TEST BAN THRESHOLD UNDER A CTB WOULD BE ZERO KILOTONS, AS THE NETHERLANDS SEES IT, "THE PNE AGREEMENT HAS NOT GIVEN US A CLUE HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONDUCTING PNES UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN." AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, VAN DER KLAUW ADDED, THIS SEEMS VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, AND WITHOUT A SOLUTION THE CHOICE WOULD BE BETWEEN ABANDONING PNES OR NOT HAVING A FOOLPROOF CTB.

3. VAN DER KLAUW INDICATED THAT MON OTHER POSSIBLE APPROACHES (SUCH AS PROHIBITING PNES) US AND USSR COULD HAVE TRIED TO DEVELOP A VERIFICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM PERMITTING PNES ABOVE THE WEAPON TEST THRESHOLD, BUT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PREVENTING, OR MINIMIZING CHANCE, THAT SUCH EXPLOSIONS WOULD AFFORD WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS. SUCH AN APPROACH, HE SAID, WOULD HAVE GIVEN VALUABLE INSIGHTS INTO THE NATURE OF A PNE REGIME UNDER A CTB. VAN DER KLAUW INDICATED INTEREST IN KNOWING DEGREE TO WHICH US AND USSR HAD PURSUED THAT PATH, SINCE THE INFORMATION WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR CTB DELIBERATIONS.

4. CONGRATULATING US AND USSR FOR "A NUMBER OF INNOVATIVE AND ELEGANT SOLUTIONS FOR DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, "VAN DER KLAUW NOTED THAT PNE TREATY'S INSPECTION PROVISIONS WOULD ALSO APPLY TO PNE WITH A COMBINED YIELD OF OVER 150 KILOTONS WHICH EITHER NATION CARRIES OUT AT THE REQUEST OF THIRD COUNTRIES. PRAISING INCLUSION OF ON-SITE OBSERVATION PROVISIONS, VAN DER KLAUW REMARKED THAT "IT IS ENCOURAGING TO KNOW HOW FAR STATES ARE PREPARED TO GO IF THE POLITICAL WILL IS PRESENT." PERHAPS, HE SUGGESTED, THE NPT REVCON RECOMMENDATIONS THAT NWS PARTIES TO THE NPT ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES COULD NOW BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED.

5. ON THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ITSELF, VAN DER KLAUW REPEATED PREVIOUS DUTCH CRITICISM THAT THRESHOLD WAS TOO HIGH, AND AGAIN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF DATA FOR CALIBRATION AND TEST SITES.

6. PRAISING SWEDISH INITIATIVE ON SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP, VAN DER KLAUW DESCRIBED GROUP'S FUNCTION AS "DETERMINING IN PRACTICE HOW AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC VERIFICATION SYSTEM COULD WORK AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE AND WHAT MEASURES ARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE." NEIHERLANDS PARTICIPATION IN EXPERTS GROUP DOES NOT IMPLY A CHANGE IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT SUFFICIENT CTB VERIFICATION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY NATIONAL MEANS. CITING VARIOUS EASTERN BLOC STATEMENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR, INCLUDING USSR'S ON SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE AS SUPPLEMENT TO CTB VERIFICATION (FEB 17), AND CZECHOSLOVAK DECLARATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH EXCHANGE, VAN DER KLAUW DECLARED IT "SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY" THAT NONE OF THE BLOC COUNTRIES HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN SEISMIC EXPERTS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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GROUP.

7. ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CTB, VAN DER KLAUW SAID ISSUE SYMBOLIZES QUESTION OF WHETHER THE GREAT POWERS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT WISHING TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND WORK TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. ALTHOUGH HE SAID A CTB WOULD BE ONLY ONE OF MANY STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE NPT VIABLE IN THE LONG RUN, VAN DER KLAUW DECLARED THAT US AND USSR DO NOT APPRECIATE HOW IMPORTANT SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND HOW MUCH IT WOULD INFLUENCE DECISIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 NRC-05 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 EUR-12

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00

NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 SAJ-01

EB-07 COME-00 JUSE-00 FTC-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 /131 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

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8. NIGERIAN REP (CLARK) THANKED DELEGATIONS FOR THEIR
INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION IN MID-TERM REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT
DECADE. HE PRAISED TECHNIQUE OF DEVOTING PARTICULAR PLENARY
SESSIONS TO SPECIFIED SUBJECTS, SUGGESTING THIS ALSO BE
DONE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
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ISSUES DURING THE SPRING 1977 SESSION. CLARK INTRODUCED A WORKING PAPER, WHICH HE SAID EMBODIES A SET OF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE DISARMAMENT DECADE AND OVERALL DISARMAMENT ISSUES "WHICH CAN BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS."

9. IN "PRELIMINARY REACTIONS" TO REMARKS BY ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE AT PRECEDING PLENARY JULY 29 (REPORTED REFTEL, CLARK STATED THAT "NO ATTEMPT TO SHIFT INTEREST TO THE INCREASING TRAFFIC IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY." ALLEGING THAT ARMS EXPORT PRESSURES HAVE NOT COME FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THAT SUCH EXPORTS SERVE THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY INTERESTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES MAKING THEM, HE COMPLAINED THAT "ONE NEWLY-INDEPENDENT COUNTRY HAS BEEN SET OFF AGAINST ANOTHER, NOT TO MENTION ARMS MANUFACTURERS BRIBING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS." ARMS TRADE, CLARK SAID, IS SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE PROFIT FOR LARGE NUMBER OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

10. PAKISTANI ALTERNATE REP (SALEEM) DECLARED REGARDING ENMOD CONVENTION THAT THRESHOLD APPROACH IS NOT SUITABLE IN CASE OF ENMOD AND THAT USE OF WORDS "WIDESPREAD, LONG-LASTING OR SEVERE" WILL MAKE CONVENTION DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET. HE ACCORDINGLY CALLED FOR THEIR DELETION. ON THE OTHER HAND, ARGUING THAT "A THREAT CAN DO INCALCULABLE HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF THE THREATENED STATE," PAKISTANI REP CALLED FOR ADDING A PROHIBITION ON THREAT OF USE. ON ARTICLE II, HE AGREED WITH PLACING LIST OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES IN AN ANNEX, BUT DECLARED THE LIST SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ENMOD TECHNIQUES "WHICH ARE OSTENSIBLY PEACEFUL BUT COULD POSSIBLY BE DIVERTED TO HOSTILE USE."

11. SALEEM AGREED THAT PEACEFUL ENMOD USES SHOULD BE PERMITTED, AS IN THE PRESENT TEXT OF ARTICLE III, BUT MAINTAINED THEY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE CONVENTION'S PROVISIONS RATHER THAN INDEPENDENT OF IT. IN PARTICULAR, HE ARGUED FOR SAFEGUARDS OF SOME SORT PREVENTING OSTENSIBLY PEACEFUL USES FROM BEING DIVERTED TO HOSTILE USE AGAINST A NEIGHBORING STATE. DISCUSSING ORIGINAL DRAFT OF ARTICLE V (COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE), HE CRITICIZED SECURITY COUNCIL EXCLUSIVE RECOURSE TO FOR COMPLAINTS, DECLARING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THAT "IT IS INADMISSIBLE TO PROVIDE STATUTORY POWERS TO SOME STATES TO HOLD UP INTERNATIONAL ACTION WHILE DEVASTATION ON SCALE ENVISAGED IN THE CONVENTION IS TAKING PLACE." THEREFORE, HE SAID, PAKISTAN LOOKED FORWARD WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL

CONSULTATIONS REGARDING ARTICLE V.

12. CZECHOSLOVAK REP (RUZEK), IN TOUR D'HORIZON OF CCD ISSUES, CALLED FOR INCLUSION OF BAN ON THREAT IN ARTICLE I OF ENMOD TREATY. HE SAID COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE IN ARTICLE V SHOULD FOCUS ON FACT-FINDING. RUZEK WELCOMED PROGRESS ON ENMOD CONVENTION AND HOPED WORK COULD BE CONCLUDED DURING SUMMER SESSION. HE ANNOUNCED CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S INTEREST TO SEND AN EXPERT ON NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS DURING WEEK OF AUG 9.

13. ON CW ISSUES, RUZEK SAID RECENT INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS SHOWED "A CERTAIN NARROWING OF THE DIFFERENCES," BUT THAT VERIFICATION AND CONTROL ISSUES REMAIN TO BE SOLVED. HE DECLARED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM USING "SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES CONCERNED AND NATIONAL MEANS OF CONTROL," AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING UK DRAFT PROPOSAL ON CW. CZECHOSLOVAK REP WELCOMED CONCLUSION OF PNE TREATY, BUT REGRETTED THAT CTB NEGOTIATIONS CALLED FOR IN THE SOVIET-SPONSORED 1975 UNGA RESOLUTION HAVE NOT OCCURRED. SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP, HE DECLARED THT TECHNICAL STEPS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT UNTIL ALL NUCLEAR STATES TAKE POSITIVE MEASURES REGARDING CTB NEGOTIONS.

4. IRANIAN REP (FARTASH) FOUND RECENT INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS ON CW REWARDING, BUT EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR US AND USSR TO CONTINUE THEIR CONTACTS PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT ON A POSSIBLE JOINT INITIATIVE. FARTASH SAID US PROPOSAL FOR TECHINICAL EXCHANGES SHOULD RECEIVE CARFUL ATTENTION, AND JOINED WITH SWEDEN AND UK IN CALLING FOR AN OVERALL COMPILATION OF CW VIEWS, "AS CONCISE AND TO THE POINT AS POSSIBLE." IN ADDITION, HE WELOCMED FORTHCOMING UK DRAFT CW PROPOSAL.

15. IRANIAN REP NOTED A NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES INTHE CCD LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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R YXPE OF A CW BA
, AS WELL AS CONSIDERABLE AGREEMENT
ON A PHOSSED APPROACH EZW AGENTS TO BE INRLU
ED IN FIRST
STAGE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, HE SAID, "THE INCLUSION OF DUAL
PURPOSE CW AGENTS WOULD SEEM ALSO TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF
QUANTITIES WHLZID GACQ NO JUSTIFIQATILEME PURPOSES AND THE PRODUCTION
OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE
CURTAILED."

16. ACCORDING TO FARTASH, VERIFICATION ISSUES WOULD BE
MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE THAN THOSE OF SCOPE OF PROHIBITION.

A LARGE PART OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO APPLY
TO A BAN ON CW PRODUCTION, BUT THE QUESTION OF WHAT
VERIFICATION METHODS TO APPLY IS UNSOLVED Q*45- #
PRAISED UDVSAGGARJTS TOWARD WHAT HE TERMED "TECHNICAL
INSPECTION," AND SAID THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED
ABOUT
VERIFICATION METHODS
S J

MOST EFFECTIVE AND
LEAST INTRUSIVE, THE DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL
SUPERVISION VS NATIONAL INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS MIGHT BE
ILLUSTRATED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF CW STOCKPILES,
FARTASH SUGGESTED AVOIDING AN UNEQUAL BURDEN ON COUNTRIES
WITH SMALL STOCKPILES BY VARYING THE AMOUNT TO BE
DESTROYED ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATED STOCKPILE OF THE
COUNTRY INVOLVED.

17. NEXT PLENARY SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY, AUG 5. CATTO

NOTE BY OC/T: GENEVA 6286 SEC 2/2 PARAS 15 & 16 GARBLED CORRECTION
TO FOLLOW

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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
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Margaret P. Grafeld
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EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

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Subject: S, SUGGESTING THIS ALSO BE DONE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES DURING THE SPRING 1977 SESSION. CLARK INTRODUCED
TAGS: PARM, CA, PK, NI, IR, CCD
To: SECSTATE WASHDC BONN LAGOS LONDON KARACHI MOWCOW THE HAGUE PRAGUE
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